

2.5. Leaving Turin

- People will taste the flavour of the high speed only in France, as the lack of Turin interconnection will force all TGV/TAV to pass over the historical line until San Didero, then continuing into the International segment and part of the France segment at 120-130Kmh.
- There won't be any station in the Susa Valley, not even near to the ski stations of the 2006 winter Olympics games, because the line is hundreds of meter under the ground level. The only service and safety station will be at Modane, 360 meter underground. Perhaps French might open it in the future, if they see the business of shortening the distance between Milan, Turin for advantaging France ski stations.
- Passengers will arrive at Lyon in not less than 2 hours and 10 minutes. This because the speed will be limited by the freight trains into the International segment and partly by the historical line. The saving of 1:25 over the current travel duration of 3:35 (Artesia data) is due to several factors as: the faster speed of the line (-45 min), the fact that the new line is shorter (-30 min), there is no stop at Modane for changing the operating personnel (-5 min) and at Chambéry (-5 min). The LTF advertisement of tacking 1:45 is just not credible because the average speed would be 145 Km/h, which is too high.
- Arriving at Paris in 4:20 minimum (typically 4:30) as the faster TGV, over the Lyon-Paris segment takes 1:55 minutes minimum and 2:15 typically (SNCF data). On this journey the saving will be limited to 1 hour.

2.6. The transportation of the passengers

The current cost of a two ways 2nd class ticket Turin to Paris over the TAV/TGV amounts to 220€ or 330€ for a first class ticket (SNCF and Trenitalia official fares). Once the line will be operating the cost of the tickets will have to be aligned according to western Europe fares, including amortization of the project, so that the cost of a two ways 2nd class ticket will be around 400-450 €.

Compatible airline fares or even lower than the railway ones can be easily found even today. Most likely peoples in hurry will continue to travel by plane, because now it takes 3:30 from Turin centre to Paris centre and most of the people travelling on his own or with the family will continue to take ordinary trains or the car.

LTF and RFI admit that the passenger transportation by itself will not be enough to economically justify the project and to sustain its cost, which means that tickets will be sold out under cost and there will be the need of other sources to compensate the loss, in principle the freight transportation. It is as well to be demonstrated that there will be enough people for 18 daily long distance trains for each direction, 14 TAV/TGV trains 350 m long plus 4 long distance ordinary trains 250 m long, for more than 10,000 people per day, each way.

2.7. The freight transportation

LTF estimates that the historical line saturation will occur between 2015 and 2020, about 3 millions trucks will cross the Alps, while the new line will allow:

- To transfer 1 million trucks per year to rail, which correspond to null the traffic at the Frejus motorway tunnel.
- To transport 40Mt freights in the 2030. Promoter estimation made on 1991. (see Fig 2.7-2)
- To transport 20Mt freights in 2020. Promoter estimation made in 1997 [10].
- Transportation of 4000 passengers per day

One of the crucial questions is the capacity of the historical line, which has been estimated by different parties and methods. In fact, there is in no universal method to compute a railway capacity.




Fig. 2.7-1 Goods traffic & TAV promoters hypothesis




Fig. 2.7-1 Freight transport across the Alps

- The joint SNCF-RFF-FS study of March 2000 estimated via a conservative formula a capacity of 20Mt/year, corresponding to 185 freight plus 66 passengers trains daily (251 trains in total).
- The study performed by Polinomia on May 2004, shown a capacity of 27Mt/year, corresponding to 150 freight plus 70 passengers trains daily, assuming improvement of the line and the electrical power stations.

Two interesting facts can be observed from the transportation forecast shown in Fig 2.7-1.

- TAV promoters consider a start of the line construction in 2006 (!), i.e. the year saturation minus the 9 years of works (see also para. 2.14).
- The forecast of the promoters conducted in 1991 was envisaging a freight increase from the 8Mt of the 1991 to 13.5Mt into 2002 and to 20Mt into 2015 (saturation). Unfortunately in the 2002, which was in the middle of the forecast interval, the transported freight where only 9.6Mt. Freight increase by 1.6Mt against a prediction of 4.5Mt, which is a factor **3 overestimation**.
- The situation has worsened after 2002 and in the 2004 the amount of freight transported was only 6.9 Mt, which is even less than the amount at the time the promoters made the estimation.
- This allows saying that the model of the freight traffic development used by the promoters was such that the estimation of the demand evolution of the freight traffic was 3 times higher than the reality. The used model was simply not realistic and totally uncorrelated with the demand and country exchanges.
- The saturation of the line by projecting the past trend into the future, even with the conservative maximum capacity value estimated by the joint study mentioned before, would occur only in 2055, leading to a quite a long time, at least up to 2040, to improve the current line, observing the traffic evolution so to make decision whether to build or not the new line. Transportation evolution does not justify promoter's hurry.

A certain percentage of the freights currently transported over the historical line are directed or are coming from the Northern Europe (North of France, The Netherlands, Belgium, England) or to/from the Southern France, even if the Frejus is not the shortest path.

- Can we exclude that someone has attempted to deviate traffic over Frejus for justifying the need of a new high capacity line?
- Would this remain so in the future ?

| International transportation matrix year 2004 (tons x 1000) | <i>Austria - Switzerland</i> | <i>Belgio Luxembourg</i> | <i>East Europe</i> | <i>France</i> | <i>Germany</i> | <i>Italy</i> | <i>North East Europe</i> | <i>Netherland</i> | <i>Scandinavia</i> | <i>South East Europe</i> | <i>Spain Portugal</i> | <i>Total</i> |
|--|------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------|---------------|----------------|--------------|--------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|--------------|
| <i>Austria - Switzerland</i> | 656 | 429 | 2,007 | 558 | 7,307 | 5,510 | 995 | 425 | 204 | 2,223 | 44 | 20,358 |
| <i>Belgio Luxembourg</i> | 767 | 1,937 | 39 | 5,617 | 4,699 | 3,249 | 131 | 1,764 | 267 | 24 | 192 | 18,686 |
| <i>East Europe</i> | 3,146 | 88 | 3,169 | 22 | 926 | 600 | 26,017 | 13 | 20 | 1,077 | 15 | 35,093 |
| <i>France</i> | 247 | 5,914 | 9 | 0 | 2,399 | 5,746 | 170 | 361 | 351 | 130 | 386 | 15,713 |
| <i>Germany</i> | 8,834 | 3,741 | 1,338 | 4,698 | 0 | 11,326 | 5,707 | 2,257 | 2,290 | 421 | 756 | 41,368 |
| <i>Italy</i> | 1,141 | 2,007 | 225 | 1,813 | 4,576 | 0 | 394 | 728 | 467 | 239 | 31 | 11,621 |
| <i>North East Europe</i> | 11,610 | 277 | 3,184 | 556 | 14,522 | 822 | 22,641 | 352 | 326 | 1,008 | 59 | 55,357 |
| <i>Netherland</i> | 246 | 1,261 | 131 | 1,044 | 13,484 | 1,318 | 587 | 0 | 94 | 2 | 9 | 18,176 |
| <i>Scandinavia</i> | 243 | 260 | 4 | 367 | 2,175 | 862 | 148 | 62 | 17,310 | 9 | 3 | 21,443 |
| <i>South East Europe</i> | 3,283 | 166 | 1,384 | 108 | 105 | 1,222 | 379 | 3 | 19 | 823 | 8 | 7,500 |
| <i>Spain Portugal</i> | 15 | 199 | 13 | 433 | 676 | 35 | 33 | 9 | 2 | 6 | 1,126 | 2,547 |
| Total | 30,188 | 16,279 | 11,503 | 15,216 | 50,869 | 30,690 | 57,202 | 5,974 | 21,350 | 5,962 | 2,629 | 247,862 |
| Legenda <i>North East Europe</i> <i>Poland, Czech Rep, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia</i> <i>East Europe</i> <i>Hungaria, Romania, Ukraine</i> <i>South East Europe</i> <i>Croatia, Serbia-Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia-Hzergovina, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece</i> <i>Scandinavia</i> <i>Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sveden</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Tab 2.7-1. International transportation matrix – year 2004 – (processing of Eurostat data)

To understand the transportation fluxes among the states, Eurostat transportation matrices are used. Tab 2.7-1 is the matrix of the year 2004, which has been simplified by grouping states pertaining to the same geographical area. Traffic data of 1995, 2001 and 2002 are estimated because of Italian data are missing. The rows of the matrix represent the goods quantity in thousand of tons loaded into a country (export), the columns are those unloaded (import).

The goods transiting across Italy and France border are from two groups: 1) Italian import-export with France, Spain and Portugal, 2) goods just transiting across Italy. Tab 2.7.1 reports these data in green and yellow cells respectively. The matrices allow as well identifying freights that should not pass in the Frejus/Ventimille tunnels, because shorter paths exist in France or Switzerland); such data are in white cells.

The last category includes the goods definitely not passing across Italy-France border, which are identified in grey cells (e.g. Scandinavia to North Eastern Europe). The total freight that would have passed at Ventimiglia and Frejus in 2004 is 7.964 Mt.

The historical behaviour, obtained by repeating this exercise for the past years, can be compared with the traffic measured at the Frejus railway tunnel, which should have been always lower. Unfortunately the Frejus traffic was almost always higher than the geographical natural traffic, in particular in the 2000 it was almost 3 million tons higher. This proves that at Frejus has taken care of goods normally addressed to other tunnels. This will be later on confirmed as well by an institutional report and by the France audit.

The answer to the second question is more complex and it has to be approached considering the contribution of the Frejus to the overall freight transported by rail across the Alps. In the past about 25% of all goods transiting across the Alps were passing through the Frejus tunnel (see Fig. 2.7-4). The Frejus sharing has started to decrease in 2000 because of shift of part of the traffic to other passes and because of the decrease of the goods and trains density (see para 4.1), so that it went down to 16% in 2004. Even if not mentioned and not accounted by the Turin-Lyon promoters, the amount of traffic in an alpine pass depends on traffic and events on all other passes. In the Alps (see Fig 2.7-2) there are other 3 railway tunnels under construction or improvement: Lötschberg (completed in 2007) connected to Simplon tunnel, Gottardo (completed in 2014) and Brennero. In 10 years, Simplon/ Lötschberg and Gottardo will take away from Frejus all the freight traffic toward the North-West of Europe.

Unfortunately the single-track railways Genoa-Savona-Ventimiglia and Nice-Cuneo-Turin, will not help to alleviate the traffic over the Frejus, until properly enhanced. The rails doubling of the Genoa-Ventimille line is on going, with a forecast of completion on the Italian side by 2010 and on France side by 2015. This also means that starting the 2015 all traffic between Spain/Portugal and centre/south Italy will move from Frejus to Ventimille.

No improvement is so far planned for the Turin-Cuneo-Nice, which would provide an other connection to southern France, particularly suitable in view of the three rails enhancement of the Marseille-Ventimille line.

Coming back to the second question, for understanding the influence of the other passes the exercise can be




Fig 2.7-3 Freight traffic at Italy-France border




Fig 2.7-4 Frejus and Alps railway traffic and ratio




Fig 2.7-5 Freight + fleeting traffic at Ventimille - Frejus - Simplon

limited to adjacent ones, Ventimille and Simplon, by considering their average freight and passenger daily traffic (over 365 days), the capacity of the lines and estimating the global traffic trend by an increasing of 1% yearly for the Fleeting trains (optimistic) and 2% yearly for freight trains, European average.

No change of transportation policies (e.g. ferroutage improvement) is here considered because of the unknown of their implementation and results. This will be discussed in para 4.3.

The capacity of the three passes together increases from 388 trains/day of today to 598 in 2015 (Fig 2.7-5)

- The first increment is in 2007 at the completion of the Lötschberg, which brings the capacity of Simplon from 140 trains/day to 220.
- The second is at the completion of the Genoa Ventimille rails doubling on 2010, which will increase the capacity from 90 trains/day to 200 and further to 220 trains/day on the 2015, once also the French side enhancement will be completed.
- The capacity of the Frejus tunnel is considered unchanged to 158 trains/day.

The result is that in year 2030 there will be still 200 free traces, without doing anything on the historical line.

Now before understanding what is the effect at the Frejus, there is a need of defining the criterion of traffic rearrangement. The criterion of the traffic geographical optimisation is complex and in practical terms impossible to be implemented, while an intuitive criterion as the equal repartition is more suitable and logical for adjacent passes. An example can be the Ventimille line, saturated now by a lot of fleeting trains and with only a tens of freight trains. From the point in time in which the rails doubling will be completed the freight trains will increase might be to 50, reducing 40 trains from Frejus, which in turns will be able to take might be 20 trains from Simplon and in turn 5 or 6 from Luino and Chiasso line. It is just a question of a bit of time, but the traffic at the end will rearrange. The fact of having limited the study to the Frejus adjacent lines is not so important as the influence of the passes eastern to Simplon is negligible on Ventimille and Frejus traffic.

Fig 2.7-6 shows finally the effect at the traffic evolution at the Frejus due the improvement of the Genoa Ventimille line and Lötschberg tunnel. The computation is not so precise, the evolution change will not be so sudden, however it must be accounted that long term projection are never exact because of the dependence on economical and political status of the states.

The real important element is that in a close system as the Alpine railway crossings, the increase of a capacity of one of the passes reflects beneficial effect to all others.

As a consequence, a projection over a single pass, as done by the Turin-Lyon promoters, ignoring all railway enhancements performed around the Alps, is totally incorrect.




Fig. 2.7-6 Evolution of Frejus railway traffic

As stated into the **UE white book**, the very low speed of the international freight, which was 18Km/h in 2001, and 30Km/h in 1972, **is not so much affected by the speed of the trains**. The major role is played by the logistics needed for composing the trains, for moving/dispatching railcars, for changing locomotive, for custom operations, for technical verification of the wagons, for the dead time spent by the railcars while waiting for the next trains with the proper destination. The logistics for moving big railcars and composing/decomposing trains is the same since a century and the increase of goods amount and train lengths has just made it worse.

In such a condition, it is evident that a global recovery of the freight transportation speed and therefore the chance of the railway transportation to become competitive, neither depends from the increase of speed nor from the reduction of the distance, as 100Km difference has less than 2% influence over the overall time.

An independent source, as the Primola project, realized in the frame of the Interreg II Programme and in particular the synthesis published on December 2001 issue of "Ingeneria Ferroviaria" states literally:

*The Simplon railway tunnel has not seen a traffic increase as the other adjacent alpine railway crossings, this was due to the spatial evolution of the transportation demands as well as to the **preference given to the Modane path**, even if for some traffic **the transit to the Simplon tunnel would have been shorter**"*

The study presented in 2001 by Alpetunnel, the company to which the CIG had assigned the tunnel design, states (translated from Italian with author comment in brackets):

*The Turin Lyon railway line is definitely non-competitive and forcing trucks to use it would require a fare of 100-200 € applied to **all trucks crossing the Alps**, which would be much more difficult that making the tunnel. The Europe traffic forecast is not encouraging: according to the presented report, the freight transportation by rail is decreased by 23% in the last 30 years and projections are even worse for the 2025.*

*In the privileged passing point of Frejus tunnel, the freight has reached 10Mt (in 1997) which corresponds to an **increment of 18%** in the period 1990-1997, **against a projection of + 118% made by the Promoters in 1991, on which the decision to built a new line has been taken.** Worsen and worsen is the passengers transportation, decreased by 15% into the decennium 1990-2000, against the forecasted growth of 500%. The TGV will allow only 50 minutes saving over the Turin-Lyon path, not 1.5 hours as advertised, and the ferroutage will attract about 2 or 3 thousand TIR.*

*The same report establishes that the line Turin-Lyon will move only 0.8% of the freight from the road to the rail (**Which is very different from a 1 million trucks reduction per year advertised by promoters!**)*

A question arise spontaneously concerning the reason of so much insistence to build up this line even if since 2001 the Promoters had in their hands studies reporting the usefulness of the project. Beyond sentences of circumstance like "it 's necessary, it's unavoidable, it's strategic", a true answer together with a **consolidated study showing that it is a good investment, do not exist.**

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59. DECISIONE DELLA COMMISSIONE del 30 maggio 2002 relativa alle specifiche tecniche d'interoperabilità per il sottosistema energia del sistema ferroviario transeuropeo ad alta velocità di cui all'articolo 6, paragrafo 1, della direttiva 96/48/CE [notificata con il numero C(2002) 1949]
60. DIRETTIVA 2001/14/CE DEL PARLAMENTO EUROPEO E DEL CONSIGLIO del 26 febbraio 2001 relativa alla ripartizione della capacità di infrastruttura ferroviaria, all'imposizione dei diritti per l'utilizzo dell'infrastruttura ferroviaria e alla certificazione di sicurezza
61. DIRETTIVA 96/48/CE DEL CONSIGLIO del 23 luglio 1996 relativa all'interoperabilità del sistema ferroviario transeuropeo ad alta velocità
62. DIRETTIVA 95/19/CE DEL CONSIGLIO del 19 giugno 1995 riguardante la ripartizione delle capacità di infrastruttura ferroviaria e la riscossione dei diritti per l'utilizzo dell'infrastruttura
63. COMMISSION DECISION of 30 May 2002 concerning the technical specification for interoperability relating to the rolling stock subsystem of the trans-European high-speed rail system referred to in Article 6(1) of Directive 96/48/EC (notified under document number C(2002) 1952)
64. Oggetto: Aiuti di Stato N 810/2002 – Italia Piano di incentivazione per il trasporto di merci per ferrovia -articolo 38 della legge 1° agosto 2002, n. 166 - C(2003)4538fin

Local Administration and Associations documentation:

In addition, all comments, observations and petitions prepared from 2002 until now and sent to Institutions, by:

- Local administrations as Comunità Bassa Val Susa e Val Cenischia (CMBVS), Communs,
- Environmentalists associations, e.g. Legambiente, WWF, Habitat, Pro Natura Torino,...
- Spontaneous committees against the Turin-Lyon
- Letters of solidarity of associations and institutions