

2.11. The costs

Cost of the International Segment				
Data in € millions	Italy	France	Total	Cost criteria
Basic Tunnel 53.1 Km	432	2448	2880	Proportional to 7.97Km in Italy and 45.13 Km in France
Tunnel Venaus-Chianocco 12.5 Km	960		960	Cost totally under Italy
External works (trench-viaduct..)	236	123	359	Proportionally to length of part not in tunnel
Railway system	255	480	735	Proportional to 25.5Km in Italy and 47.7 Km in France
Non railway systems	40	224	264	Proportional to 7.97Km in Italy and 45.13 Km in France
Imprevisti	273	466	739	Proportional to Italian and France sharing costs
Other (non declared)	282	481	763	as above
Total for International Segment	2479	4221	6700	<i>Data from LTF (Jan 2005)</i>
	37%	63%	100%	
Italy-French agreement	4221	2479	6700	MoU - Lunardi-Robien May 2004
	63%	37%	100%	

Tab 2.11-1 Geographical sharing of International segment cost (Official data from LTF- apportioned by the author)

The 2001 cost estimation was 6700 M€ (6695 for correctness) for the International segment, 2300 M€ for the Italian segment and about 4100 for the French, thus the total project cost was 13100 M€ (M€ = € million).

On Dec 23rd 2004 CIPE has approved the Italian part of the International segment at a cost of 6957 M€ (+3.8%), while for the Italian segment there is just a reference to the 2003 estimate. It will be approved on August 2005 (but published only in March 2006) for an amount of 2375 M€, correspondent to about 2300 M€ at 2003 economic conditions.

The definition of the segment made at para 2.1 allows to compute the geographic cost sharing of the International segment as 2479 M€ (37%) in Italy and 4221 M€ in France, as highlighted in Tb 2.11-1. Totals and percentages are exact, while the author estimates the sharing of each individual element.

The geographical cost sharing of the entire Turin-Lyon is again in the same ratio, 37% for Italy and 63% for France as shown in Tab 2.11-2. This is not to be confused with the sharing of the financing.

The average cost of the International segment is of 91 M€/Km, while the cost for the various typology of the line is varying from 70M€/Km for the external parts over embankment to a maximum of 114 M€/Km for the Chianocco-Venaus tunnel.

The cost of the national segment seems underestimated being the average cost of 51M€, not even sufficient for the simpler external parts and for sure not enough for tunnels. This seem confirmed by the fact that a 23Km external segment of the high speed railway Turin-Milan has cost 1426 M€ (EC 2003), equivalent to 62 M€/Km. By using such data the cost of the national segment would increase to 3800 M€, instead of 2300, which is +65% of the RFI estimation.

The CIPE approval of the national segment, is favourable to the Turin crossing, providing the design is submitted and cost stays within the approved cost of the national segment, which is impossible being the cost estimation for the Turin crossing equal o 1000 M€.

Geographical Cost Distribution	Italy	France	Total
Italian Segment	2300		2300
International Segment	2479	4221	6700
French Segment		4085	4085
Total	€ millions	4779	8306
		37%	63%
			100%

Tab 2.11-2 Geographical cost sharing of entire Turin-Lyon

High Speed Cost-Italy (€ millions)	August 1991	August 2001	May 2002
Naple-Rome	2014	4984	6559
Roma-Florence	207	351	775
Florence-Bologna	1085	4209	5113
Bologna-Milan	1498	5733	6921
Milan-Turin	1085	2789	4803
Milan-Verona	1136		4700
Verona- Venezia	878		4235
Genoa – Milan	1601		6249
Total (€ millions)	9503	18066	39354
% Increase	0%	90%	314%

(source:GUASCO - Services to Industries - Bologna)

Tab 2-11-3 Italian TAV cost evolution

A very import point concerning cost is the trend of the consolidated cost of the on going Italian TAV projects (see Tab 2.11-3), which shows an increase of a 4.4 times (+314%) in a 10 year period, from the initial estimates. Even by removing the effect of the inflation by escalating the price from 1991 to EC 2002, which equates to +42%, the remaining net cost increase is still 292% in 11 years, i.e. 10.2% cumulative per year on top of the inflation. Not bad! Applying the above typical cost increase for project of the same nature, over a 15 years construction period, than the overall cost of the Turin-Lyon would range around 64000 M€.

This is not all, because to this cost most likely will sum up all so far neglected costs elements, including the disposal of eventual dangerous material, for difficulties encountered due to water and gas inside tunnels, archaeological findings and for all actions implemented for mitigating the impact on the environment.

2.12. Who is financing the Turin- Lyon ?

Despite the 65% of the line is into French territory and 35% in Italy, the representatives of the Italian government as agreed with the French counterpart to equally share the cost of the project. The MOU (Memorandum of Understanding), signed in May 2004 between the Italian former transportation minister Mr Lunardi and the French Robien, states:

- The cost of the international segment are split as 37% for France and 63% for Italy, over a reference amount of 6700 M€ at January 2003 EC, (i.e. ~2600 M€ for France and ~ 4220 M€ for Italy).
- The costs of the French and Italian segment are in charge of the respective countries.
- The eventual additional costs are equally shared, providing that the total increase remains within 15% of the initial reference amount of 6700 M€. Sharing of costs in addition to 15% is subject to case by case agreement. French are conscious of the typical cost increase on running Italian TAV projects.

The CEE law (2236/95) allows a 10% financing of the total cost of the sole infrastructure segments across borders of the states. Extension to 20% is allowed in case, priority projects mentioned into the CEE decision 1692/96/CE (Turin-Lyon is part of those), are initiated within 2010.

The above leads to some considerations:

- The importance of the project must not be confused with the necessity of realising it regardless the implications. In other words, **no European directive supersedes the environmental impacts.**
- The condition of starting the works within 2010 for accessing to EU financing up to 20% can be interpreted in several ways, as for instance for facilitating the availability of short term financing, but also for discouraging long term projects which by that time are not able to justify their necessity. Despite the interpretation, this constitutes a stimulus for the various construction companies, for start working before 2010, with the risk that some of this project is abandoned after few years. It is difficult to say if this will be the case of the Turin-Lyon, however it is sure that as stated literally into the MOU: *The two States commit to **put in place all possible means to maximise the contribution given by the UE.***
- The UE contributions do not fall from the sky, sooner or later will be paid back by the population of the member states, directly (e.g. taxes) or indirectly (e.g. reduction of local productions).

As a consequence of the agreement, the forecasted cost of the project is financed 50% each (about 6500 M€) as shown in Tab 2.12-1, but Italy is contributing with 1800 M€ higher than the cost under its territory (4779 M€) and for the France this represent an appealing discount.

Supposing a 10% contribution from UE, then the sharing established by Lunardi Robien agreement changes as shown in the right side of Tab 2.12-1. The France will finance only 6316 M€ of the 8306 M€ under its territory (Tab 2.11-2) which is a discount of about 2000 M€, covered by Italy and UE, while the sharing of the International segment remains 37% and 63% for France and Italy respectively.

Sharing of National Financing	Without UE contribution			With UE contribution (10%)			
	Italy	France	Sum	Italy	UE	France	Sum
Italian Segment	2300		2300	2300			2300
International Segment (agreement)	4221	2479	6700	3799	670	2231	6700
France Segment		4085	4085			4085	4085
Total € millions	6521	6564	13085	6099	670	6316	13085
(%)	50%	50%	100%	47%	5%	48%	100%

Note: These are initial estimated costs (EC 2003) and the figures provide the overview.

Tab 2.12-1 France-Italy cost sharing with and without UE contribution

It is important to recall a part of the deliberation 5/2004/g of the central control section of the "Corte dei Conti", concerning the management of the state administration:

The Italian state financing law for the year 2003 (art 75), has substantially exceeded the aspect related to the percentage of the investment in charge to the State, giving disposition for a deep modification of the entire financing scheme of the TAV/TAC System, on which ISP is tacking the place of the State for financing the entire System. The logic of the above mentioned law is that the State does no longer finance the construction of the railway infrastructure (the AV/AC network), the company managing such infrastructure (ISPA) will have to access to credits for building the network but the revenues will not be sufficient to reimburse the debit and therefore the State will have to intervene to reimburse ISPA.

Particular relevance has the new accounting of the financing system for the AV/AC project, established by art. 75 of the law 289/2002, which for sure will have repercussion over the public finance starting from 2009, the year in which it is foreseen that the State starts intervene with considerable amount of money for integrating the coverage of the ISPA debit.

Accordingly, the Corte dei Conti deliberation does not mention the Turin-Lyon among the projects to be financed within 2009. As a consequence the works subcontracted from ISPA before the 2009 will be covered

by the banks, which will receive guarantees from the State, through Patrimonio S.p.A, by mortgaging state properties (beaches, monuments, roads..) and reimbursing them with interests, after 20-30 years. This is a bright trick of the “creative finance magicians” for not further degrading the deficit of the State public balance, avoiding the violation of the European agreed parameters, pushing onerous costs to the future generations. A trick for getting immediate profit to private companies, financiers and constructors, by investing public money of the future and leaving the debts to our sons. The same scheme will be applied to several other infrastructure projects initiated by the government in these years.

- Eurostat, which has the duty of validating the public balances of the member States, has highlighted in May 2005 that the 3% maximum increase of the ratio between the Italian public deficit and the internal gross product was indeed violated by Italy during both 2003 and 2004, because some cost elements, including ISPA for the AV/AC projects, were not considered in the balance.
- The wish of the Turin-Lyon promoter's is to access and collect private financing (see also PPP) but severe doubts arise because of the low forecasted economic results and because of the recent bad example of the Eurotunnel (France-British) where investors have lost 95%. The absence of private investors will have to be covered by the State, subtracting funds from the budget of the welfare, sanity, school and so on.
- Fortunately since Jan 2006 it wont be possible for the UE states to skip from their balances the public financing for European priority projects.

2.13. The operative costs

LTF declares that the operative cost of the international segment only, will globally amount to 65 M€ per year, including the infrastructure usage, personnel, maintenance, renewing of equipments and so on.

An independent study made by Polinomia for the CMBVS shows that 40 Mt of freight per year, corresponding to 350 daily freight trains, 1500-2000 meters long, one every 4-5 minutes, running at 150 KM/h and interleaved with fleeting trains travelling at 300Km/H, would be required to balance revenue with the above operative cost. The maintenance for granting safety and minimising noise would have a significant cost.

There is a strong doubt concerning the possibility to concentrate over a single tunnel the freight fluxes crossing the Alps in different locations as Ventimille, Bardonecchia, Domodossola, Chiasso and Brennero. Forcing truck to pass over rail is not that simple. The traffic adapts to the situation, taking other routes or continuing on motorway simply because for many products the effect of a motorway tunnel fare increase give a contribution on the product price within the daily fluctuation of the market, so the consumers will simply pay it. This is why the Turin-Lyon line will never be able to transfer significant freight traffic from road to rails.

Lack of passengers and freight trains will turn this project into an economic disaster.

2.14. The Turin-Lyon work planning

International Segment - Work Planning (data: LFT 2005)										
Description	Duration	N	N+1	N+2	N+3	N+4	N+5	N+6	N+7	N+8
Preparatory works	10 months									
Construction civil works	5 years +6 months									
Railway system assembly	2 years +3 months									
Testing	1 year									
Operational										▼
<i>Example of time scale with start of works = 2010</i>		2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018

Fig 2.14-1 Work planning for the international segment

Italian Segment - Work Planning (data: Italferr 2005)										
Descrizione	Durata	N	N+1	N+2	N+3	N+4	N+5	N+6	N+7	N+8
Aggiudicazione		▼								
Preparaz. Progetto Esecutivo	365 days									
Gallerie naturali	2157 days									
Tratte all'aperto e gallerie artif.	1873 days									
Attrezzature e prove	600 days									
Messa in servizio										▼
<i>Example of time scale with start of works = 2006</i>		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014

Fig 2.14-2 Work planning for the national segment

According to LTF and RFI, the construction of the international segment tunnels will take about 6 years and 4 months, initiating the excavation from different 12 places, then other 2.5 years will be necessary to put in place rails, electrical stuff, aerial power line, all the equipments and to perform testing of the line, which lasts about 1 year. The time necessary to build and to get the line operational is about 9 years, leading to start the work within the 2009 should the line be functioning by 2018, as requested by LTF.

On the basis of data from Italferr, general contractor of the Italian segment, the Italian portion should be approved by mid 2006 and the winning subcontractors will have 1 year time to present the final detailed designs (which by the way might differ from the Italferr overall design) and to complete all the constructions and the railway in a bit less than 6 years, so to have the line operational by 2012.

The time declared to build the Turin-Lyon seems not in line with trends of other AV/AC projects in Italy and a minimum of 15 years duration can be envisaged, going well beyond the 2020 target and providing that the works are not suspended for unavailability of funds. A considerable delay affects already the preparatory activities and the consequent approval of the national segment, however there's no real hurry to start.

The duration of the works will depend on the availability of financing for covering the nominal payments of the projects as well as the additional money, which will be needed in case of changes or in case of serious and unforeseen events. The LTF risk management pot, consisting of the 12% of the cost of the international segment, can be exhausted very quickly, in case of problem occurrence or in case of neglecting estimations.

Thirty years ago, the work for doubling the rails of the historical line between Bussoleno – Bardonecchia were blocked for some year due to the difficulties encountered from the contractor while building the tunnels in the area of Exilles and Salbertrand, because the presence of significant sources and infiltration of water. Another example is a tunnel recently made in the same area of the basic tunnel, but not that deep, for the construction of the Pont Ventoux power plant. The construction took 7 years against an initial estimation of 3.

2.15. *What about France ?*

- Several different commissions of experts, appointed by the French Government, have risen serious doubts over the Turin-Lyon project, which from the France audit of the 2003 resulted **as not a priority** for the France and **problematic for the cost, benefit ratio**. The report of the France super-experts was suggesting directing the near term effort toward the improvement of the historical line, as its saturation by the 2015 would be very improbable and because it was **too early to predict when it will be saturated**. This concept is reinforced by the fact that from 2003 until now, the freight transportation has decreased.
- The agreement for financing the project is appealing for France, which is now pushing for the construction of the Turin-Lyon line. The project is welcomed by several local administrations of the Maurienne, but a part of them is against, because of negative past evaluations and bad marks given by environmentalist and economical institutes (Setec Economie).
- It is worth to mention the advanced concepts developed in France as alternate to the ferroutage, for minimizing the time needed for loading/unloading. These concepts contribute improving the average speed of the railway freights, which according to the white book of the UE is now only 18 Km/h, as the improvement of the logistics is more beneficial and cost effective than increasing trains speed. The R.Shift-R and Gollor projects are based on pivoting platform and innovative railcars, so that Sea containers, full trucks or trailers can be indifferently loaded up to a total of 44t per railcar.

2.16. *The European Community and the High Speed Railway projects*

- The law L245/296 published on the European Community Official Gazette on 12 Sept 2002 defines the technical specifications and characteristics of the high speed railway lines, splitting them in 3 categories:
 1. specially built high-speed lines equipped for speeds generally equal to or greater than 250 km/h,
 2. specially upgraded high-speed lines equipped for speeds of the order of 200 km/h,
 3. specially upgraded high-speed lines which have special features as a result of topographical, relief or town-planning constraints, on which the speed must be adapted to each case;

The upgrading enhancement of the historical line Turin-Modane can fit the criteria of the 3rd category,

- Concerning the environment, the CEE directive (2002/733/CE) defines 5 essential requirements for the implementing the European railway network: 1) **Safety**, 2) reliability and availability, 3) **health**, 4) **preservation of the environment** and 5) the technical compatibility.
- The corridor number 5, frequently mentioned in the recent appearance of the Italian Prime Ministers and other politicians, is no longer existing as Lisbon-Kiev. It was defined in 1997 at the Helsinki conference, conceived as Trieste-Lubjiana- Budapest-Leopoli railway connection and in the subsequent years it was extended toward West of Italy. Since the end of 2002 the European Community has start defining **axes** and TEN-T (Trans European Network – Transport) projects, for railway, motorway and navigation lines, where the Turin to Lyon line is collocated within the Project Number 6.
- The last updating (*final report from the High Level Group chaired by Loyola de Palacio, November 2005*), defines 30 priority axes, including the number 6 as Lyon-Turin-Milan-Trieste-LubJiana-Budapest-Ukrainian border and the number 3 Lisbon-Lyon. The connection between the Ukrainian border and Kiev (about 800 Km) is not mentioned by the TEN-T and it is so far not committed by the Ukraine.
- The corridor 5 is now only a direction and no longer exclusivity of the Turin-Lyon. Trail Liguria, promotes the Genoa-Ventimille rails doubling as corridor 5 over an ordinary railway, passing through Milan, Genoa, Ventimille and Marseille, instead of Milan, Turin, Lyon and Marseille..

- Despite Italian politicians repeat that precise agreement are in place for the corridor 5, there is only the evidence of some signed bilateral agreement/MOU, while there is absolutely no trace that the European Community has never requested to implement an highly impacting project as the one currently proposed. The selection of the 30 priority axes covers the entire Europe with a flexible network and therefore it is possible to define long distance path as combination of shorter traces together. According to the above official document, none of these priority axes is privileged over the others and for instance Lisbon- Budapest can be made by joining project 3 and 6 through Turin-Milan or by joining projects 3, 24, 17 and 22 transiting in southern Germany, the resulting distances are about the same. This tells that the European Community has given the same importance of passing at north or at south of the Alps.
- Spain and Ukraine track gauges, respectively 1676 mm and 1524 mm, are different from France, Italy, Slovenia and Hungaria gauge, which measure 1434 mm. A corridor cannot be defined as such before having implemented the interoperability between the systems used in the different countries.
- An interesting highlight of the above final report is the connection between navigation lines and railways axes and the importance of the Mediterranean harbours for the connection with the far east countries (China, Japan..) through the Suez channel. The layout of the navigation lines and harbours are such that the south-north axes will support significant intercontinental traffic from/to Asia/Africa, while the east-west axes are supporting the European intrastate transportations. Lisbon-Ukrainian traffic will be almost null.
- The directive 85/337/CEE (para 4.2.3.2) requests, an evaluation of specific design data concerning the environmental impacts, plans for impact reduction and for mitigating the risks of damages to the ambient and population, together with the commitment of the member states to survey the application of the regulations, granting diffusion of the information. Unfortunately in Italy a law known as "Objective Law" limits the ambient impact evaluation to the preliminary design, skipping agreement with local administrations, so that nothing else is due when the selected subcontractors produce the detailed designs documentation.
- In 2004, the UE has opened an infraction procedure against Italy because of the General Contractor assignment in direct negotiation, violating competition regulations and because the simplified Ambient Impact Evaluation, requested by the "Objective Law", is again in contrast with the European regulations.
- As a consequence of the visit of L. de Palacio on 24 Nov 2005, the commission under her suggestion has decided to engage an independent consultancy for evaluating coherency and reliability of the LTF obtained results. The generated report "*Analisi degli studi condotti da LTF in merito alla Lione-Torino*" – international section [49], was available in French since 25 April 2006 and subsequently in Italian. The report declares that the contained viewpoints are from the experts and on page 21 of the French version there is an unproven statement against opposition, not appearing into the Italian version. The report limits the analysis to the international segment as it concern for EU financing, but instead of finding the truth, the report is limiting to judge if the design documentation of LTF has properly addressed the objections, also no judgment is made on the Ambient Impact Evaluation correctness. The report mention the power plant of Pont Ventoux but it does not even consider consequences of its coexistence with the basic tunnel. The report confuses widely the purpose of the new line, addressing analyses for the fleeting train traffic, known and also admitted to be no longer the priority. Also the reported freight traffic of the historical line is misleading being not even in line with the operations at the end of the first phase. On 26 April 2006 at the Prefettura of Turin, L. de Palacio has not endorsed the report, stating that it was documenting the judgements of the consulting and not of the UE commission.

2.17. Benefits and comfort for the Susa Valley residents

Excluding the awarding of small contracts to local firms, all the other construction and equipping works will be performed by specialized company and by their personnel coming from other region of Italy or even from other European states. This is the typical scenario of big infrastructure construction over all states. Everybody in the valley remembers the years 70th where a company from Como area was doubling the rails of the mountain part of the historical line and the same happened during the construction of the Turin - Bardonecchia A32 motorway. The personnel recruited locally have been always insignificant.

During the operational phase some resource will be employed for managing the line, the basic tunnel and the train parking area of Bruzolo, however part of the tunnel personnel will be French. About fifty people in total, a fraction of what was the personnel of the glorious Bussoleno railroad depot and workshop, where locomotives maintenance and repair was performed, but then dismantled at the beginning of the years 90.

The beneficial effects advertised by the sponsors will be limited to small business for dealers, restaurants, bars and economical operators for the duration of construction works. But we are talking about 2000 workers over a local population of about 200.000 people (Settimo Torinese to Venaus), so the effect will be very minor.

No positive effects are envisaged once the line operates, but several negative implications and damages to the ambient and to the inhabitants of the valley are envisaged, as it will be described in the next paragraph.

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43. LEGGE 27 settembre 2002, n.228 Ratifica ed esecuzione dell'Accordo tra il Governo della Repubblica italiana ed il Governo della Repubblica francese per la realizzazione di una nuova linea ferroviaria Torino-Lione, fatto a Torino il 29 gennaio 2001
44. LEGGE 21 dicembre 2001, n. 443 Delega al Governo in materia di infrastrutture ed insediamenti produttivi strategici ed altri interventi per il rilancio delle attività produttive (G.U. n. 299, 27 dicembre 2001, Supplemento Ordinario)
45. PRIMO PROGRAMMA DELLE OPERE STRATEGICHE (LEGGE N. 443/2001):
46. CIPE - Nuovo Collegamento Ferroviario Transalpino Torino-Lione, Approvazione Tratta Internazionale, Roma, 5 dicembre 2003
47. CIPE – Nuovo collegamento ferroviario nodo urbano di Torino: Potenziamento linea ferroviaria Torino Bussoleno, 05/08/2005.
48. E CINTURA MERCICorte dei conti - delibera n. 5/2004/g della sezione centrale di controllo della corte dei conti sulla gestione delle amministrazioni dello Stato, 21 Gennaio 2004

Official Documentation of the European Community (ottenibile anche in altre lingue sul siti EU e TEN-T)

49. Analisi degli studi condotti da LTF in merito al progetto Lione-Torino (sezione internazionale) TREN/05/ADM/S07.54919/2005 revised Version 2
50. TRANS-EUROPEAN TRANSPORT NETWORK European Commission TEN-T priority projects ISBN 92-894-3963-7
51. TEN-T Report from the High Level Group chaired by Loyola de Palacio, November 2005.
52. LIBRO BIANCO La politica europea dei trasporti fino al 2010: il momento delle scelte ISBN 92-894-0343-8 –ed 2001
53. Direttiva del Consiglio 85/337/CEE del 27 giugno 1985 concernente la valutazione dell'impatto ambientale di determinati progetti pubblici e privati
54. Parere del Comitato economico e sociale europeo in merito al Libro verde sui partenariati pubblico/privato e sul diritto comunitario degli appalti pubblici e delle concessioni COM(2004) 327 def. (2005/C 120/18).
55. Parere del Comitato delle regioni in merito al Libro verde sull'approccio dell'Unione europea alla gestione della migrazione economica (2006/C 31/09)
56. REGOLAMENTO (CE) n. 1159/2005 DEL PARLAMENTO EUROPEO E DEL CONSIGLIO del 6 luglio 2005 che modifica il regolamento (CE) n. 2236/95 del Consiglio, che stabilisce i principi generali per la concessione di un contributo finanziario della Comunità nel settore delle reti transeuropee
57. REGOLAMENTO (CE) N. 807/2004 DEL PARLAMENTO EUROPEO E DEL CONSIGLIO del 21 aprile 2004 recante modifica del regolamento (CE) n. 2236/95 del Consiglio, che stabilisce i principi generali per la concessione di un contributo finanziario della Comunità nel settore delle reti transeuropee
58. DECISIONE N. 1692/96/CE DEL PARLAMENTO EUROPEO E DEL CONSIGLIO del 23 luglio 1996 sugli orientamenti comunitari per lo sviluppo della rete transeuropea dei trasporti
59. DECISIONE DELLA COMMISSIONE del 30 maggio 2002 relativa alle specifiche tecniche d'interoperabilità per il sottosistema energia del sistema ferroviario transeuropeo ad alta velocità di cui all'articolo 6, paragrafo 1, della direttiva 96/48/CE [notificata con il numero C(2002) 1949]
60. DIRETTIVA 2001/14/CE DEL PARLAMENTO EUROPEO E DEL CONSIGLIO del 26 febbraio 2001 relativa alla ripartizione della capacità di infrastruttura ferroviaria, all'imposizione dei diritti per l'utilizzo dell'infrastruttura ferroviaria e alla certificazione di sicurezza
61. DIRETTIVA 96/48/CE DEL CONSIGLIO del 23 luglio 1996 relativa all'interoperabilità del sistema ferroviario transeuropeo ad alta velocità
62. DIRETTIVA 95/19/CE DEL CONSIGLIO del 19 giugno 1995 riguardante la ripartizione delle capacità di infrastruttura ferroviaria e la riscossione dei diritti per l'utilizzo dell'infrastruttura
63. COMMISSION DECISION of 30 May 2002 concerning the technical specification for interoperability relating to the rolling stock subsystem of the trans-European high-speed rail system referred to in Article 6(1) of Directive 96/48/EC (notified under document number C(2002) 1952)
64. Oggetto: Aiuti di Stato N 810/2002 – Italia Piano di incentivazione per il trasporto di merci per ferrovia -articolo 38 della legge 1° agosto 2002, n. 166 - C(2003)4538fin

Local Administration and Associations documentation:

In addition, all comments, observations and petitions prepared from 2002 until now and sent to Institutions, by:

- Local administrations as Comunità Bassa Val Susa e Val Cenischia (CMBVS), Communs,
- Environmentalists associations, e.g. Legambiente, WWF, Habitat, Pro Natura Torino,...
- Spontaneous committees against the Turin-Lyon
- Letters of solidarity of associations and institutions